From CSR to Corporate Citizenship: Anglo-American and Continental by Sison, A.J. (Alejo José)
From CSR to Corporate Citizenship: Anglo-American and Continental 
European Perspectives 
Alejo JoséG. Sison 
ABSTRACT. Beginning with the question of who constitutes the firm, this article seeks to 
explore the historical evolution of concepts such as corporate social responsibility, corporate 
accountability, corporate social responsiveness, corporate social performance, stakeholder 
theory, and corporate citizenship. In close parallel to these changes are differences in 
interpretation from AngloAmerican and Continental European perspectives. The author 
defends that the ultimate reasons behind these differences are of a philosophical nature, 
affecting both the anthropology and the political theory dominant in each of these cultures. 
Philosophically, anglo-american culture may be described as individualistic, legalistic, 
pragmatist and with an understanding of rights as freedom from state intervention. 
Continental European culture, on the other hand, is more community-oriented, more 
dependent on unwritten laws or customs, less resultsdriven or more appreciative of the 
intrinsic value of activities and with an understanding of rights as freedom to participate in 
social goods and decisions. In the end, a twist is introduced in the meaning of corporate 
citizenship: beyond referring to the firm as a citizen of the state,  it now signifies and analyzes 
the rights and responsibilities of the different ―citizens‖comprising the corporate pol¬ity. This 
new proposal constitutes the author‘s normative response to the initial research query.  
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 Int roduct ion  
Both shareholder theory and stakeholder theory have arisen as rival responses to the question 
of who properly constitutes the firm. Similarly, the concepts of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), corporate citizenship and their minor variants have emerged as different manners of 
connecting the firm to wider society. We shall trace the evolution of each of these notions 
and, despite the risks of overstatement based exclusively on geography (Phillips,  2008), 
attempt to provide an account of the differences in their interpretation from the Anglo-
American and Continental European viewpoints. 
We follow Matten and Moon (2008) in their critique of the explanatory power of agency 
theory and agree with them that institutional theory could afford a more robust account of 
the interpretive differences, for example, between Anglo-American and Continental 
European perspectives on CSR. We feel, however, that attributing variances to dif ferences 
in ―national business systems‖and their evolution to neoinstitutional mechanisms is a bit 
question-begging. Certainly, CSR in the United States and Europe are different and have 
evolved differently because of different ―national business systems‖compounded by the 
processes described by neoinstitutionalism. But could it not be, also, the  other way around, 
that because of differences in CSR in the United States and Europe, they have different 
―national business systems‖and different evolutionary paths?  
For the above-mentioned reasons, in this article we choose to go down a different path and 
focus on deeper, philosophical ideas that have shaped AngloAmerican and continental 
European images ofhuman beings, society, and institutions. Particular attention is then paid to 
citizenship, from its Aristotelian formulation to more modern typologies, namely, the liberal-
minimalist and the civic republican or communitarian models. Accordingly, liberal-minimalist 
citizenship is associated with Anglo-American culture and civic republican or communitarian 
with continental European. 
While corporate citizenship is ordinarily understood as a firm‘s membership in society, we 
propose – toward the end of the work – an alternative reading. The notion of corporate 
citizenship could also be used as an analytical tool to understand the rights and duties of the 
different constituents or stakeholders of the corporate polity. Here is where another of our 
distinct contributions lies, in nudging stakeholders to see themselves as citizens of the 
corporate polity and assume as such their corresponding rights and responsibilities. 
Who constitutes the firm? From shareholders to corporate citizens 
To the question of who constitutes the corporation, many would find ―shareholders‖a fitting 
initial response. Without their money, the funds necessary to support economic activity would 
be lacking. Although there will always be firms managed by shareholder-owners – think of 
IKEA with Ingvar Kamprad, Virgin with Richard Branson, and Benetton with Luciano 
Benetton, for example – among bigger corporations, this is more of an exception than the rule. 
The sheer size of the corporation requires that other people work for it, apart from the owner 
and family members. And these people normally work in exchange for a salary. Hence, while 
shareholders receive interests on capital, workers receive salaries for labor. All those who 
work for a corporation without owning shares belong to the professional or managerial class.  
The division between shareholders and managers has been provoked, apart from company 
size, by the specialization of tasks (Berle and Means, 1932). Increased organizational size 
brings greater functional complexity. The division and specialization of labor becomes the 
corporation‘s response to complexity and to demands for greater productivity. The separation 
of tasks is the only way to produce goods on a certain scale: think of cars or airplanes, for 
instance. Some workers would concentrate on design, others on financing, and still others on 
sales and so forth. 
After shareholders, managers and professional form the next important group of people within the 
corporation, and between them exists an ―agency relation.‖Much has already been said about the 
―agency relation,‖its strengths and difficulties. In this regard, citing Friedman (1970), the primary 
duty of managers is purportedly to make as much money as possible for shareholders within the 
law. 
Since Friedman‘s essay, parallel developments in CSR and stakeholder theory have 
pushed for a critical re-evaluation of the dominant view of the firm, based on agency 
relations and shareholder theory. Let us now turn to the first of these notions.  
Within the Anglo-American tradition, the modern discussion of CSR may be traced to 
Bowen (1953), who first proposed that managers pursue policies, make decisions and follow 
lines of action in keeping with the values and objectives of society. A few years later, Eells 
and Walton (1961) developed the concept further by referring to CSR – among other things 
– as the ethical principles that should govern the relationship between corporations and 
society. It was McGuire (1963), however, who gave a sharper focus to the understanding of 
CSR as the set of company obligations beyond the economic and legal realms.  
That corporations possess obligations outside of those defined by law could only have been 
considered a novelty within the Anglo-American tradition, characterized by individualism. Anglo-
American business thinking was conflicted since the beginning with the acceptance of a ―corporate 
responsibility‖different from the responsibilities of individual workers (Sison, 2000, p. 288). 
Unlike individual persons, corporations are mere creatures of law ―without bodies to be 
jailed nor souls to be damned.‖In consequence, would not attributing collective 
responsibilities to corporations – mere legal fictions – be foolish? Only in 1819 did the US 
Supreme Court explicitly recognize the corporation as a legal person in the Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward decision. It was established that, although the corporation is not an 
individual, physical person, before the law it, too, is a subject, albeit a collective one, of 
rights and responsibilities. Corporations are entitled to acquire or to sell property and to hire 
or to fire workers. Likewise, corporations are expected to pay taxes and to honor contracts. 
The ultimate rationale for these rights and responsibilities is to allow corporations to produce 
goods and services for the benefit directly of shareholders and indirectly of society at large.  
The other obstacle in Anglo-American business thinking‘s adoption of CSR is legalism. The 
issue is to determine the nature and scope of a corporation‘s rights and duties. The tendency 
has always been to reduce rights and duties strictly to the minimum set by law (Sison,  2000, 
pp. 288–289). When a collective ―corporate responsibility‖was first defined in the US, it was 
understood to be exclusively of a civil nature, as an obligation to pay fines and damages. It 
took almost a century later, in the New York Central Railroad v. United States verdict of 
1909, for the US Supreme Court to take a broader view and recognize a corporate ―criminal 
responsibility.‖This opened up the possibility of a corporate criminal intent and likelihood 
that employees be imprisoned for involvement in corporate criminal actions.  
By contrast, Continental European perspectives of business have been aware from the 
beginning that, insofar as firms are institutions embedded in society, they have duties apart from 
those enshrined in law. In fact, CSR has even been the object of definition by a European 
Commission document: ―Corporate social responsibility is a concept whereby companies 
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in their interaction 
with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis. It is about enterprises deciding to go beyond 
minimum legal requirements and obligations stemming from collective agreements in order to 
address societal needs. Through CSR, enterprises of all sizes, in cooperation with their 
stakeholders, can help to reconcile economic, social and environmental ambitions. [...] In Europe, 
the promotion of CSR reflects the need to defend common values and increase the sense of 
solidarity and cohesion‖(European Commission, 2006). 
Continental European views are more in keeping with the Aristotelian conception of 
corporations as contingent intermediate associations, located between families and states, for 
the purpose of producing economic goods and services (Aristotle, 1990). 
In the mid-seventies, two sets of authors made significant contributions to the development 
of CSR within the Anglo-American context. First, Davis and Blomstrom asserted that ―social 
responsibility is the obligation of decision makers to take actions which protect and improve 
the welfare of society as a whole along with their own interests‖(Davis and Blomstrom, 
1975, p. 23). Their belief is that social responsibility accompanies corporate interests and 
corporate action affects society in two ways. CSR may be understood negatively, as the duty 
to avoid harm to society and positively, as the obligation to promote social well-being. In 
that same decade, Sethi advanced a standard against for corporate behavior: its congruence 
with prevailing social norms, values, and expectations (Sethi,  1975). Not only does this 
standard transcend the legal sphere, but it also enters into the domain of social expectations.  
These two streams directly fed into Carroll‘s definition, ―The social responsibility of 
business encompasses the economic, legal, ethical and discretionary expectations that 
society has of an organization at a given point in time‖(Carroll, 1979, p. 500). This 
statement reflected a change of attitude in American courts and government agencies which 
began to accept cases against companies on social and ethical grounds, despite the absence 
of a legal basis. Such was the celebrated bribery case involving Lockheed and the Japanese 
Liberal Democratic Party, which led to the ouster of Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and the 
belated passing of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by US Congress in 1977 (Sison,  2000, 
pp. 288–289). It was an acknowledgement that corporations indeed had responsibilities 
apart from those contained in law and there was a corresponding public clamor for cor -
porations to owe up to these. 
Carroll divided CSR into four different categories – economic, legal, ethical, and discretionary – 
conceived as levels ofa pyramid (Carroll, 1991). At the base are a business‘ economic obligations, 
its duty to produce goods and services that society wants at a profit. Business must be effective, 
efficient, and follow the right strategy. When a company does not turn out a profit, not only 
does it fail to meet economic responsibilities, it would not be able to fulfill other 
responsibilities either. Next follows a corporation‘s legal responsibilities, its obligation to 
obey the laws. These laws may be local, regional, national, or even transnational. Upholding 
the law is the ―price‖a company pays for its ―license to operate‖from the state. In third place 
are a company‘s ethical obligations, its duty to comply with social customs even those not 
contained in law. Ethical responsibilities look more to achieving the spirit of the law than 
mere compliance with its letter. Ethical responsibility requires that corporate behavior be 
unquestionably above board, rather than just struggling or scraping to make the cut. Finally, at 
the top of the pyramid, are a corporation‘s discretionary or philanthropic responsibilities. 
These are not duties or obligations; they are simply expectations, indicators of what society 
deems desirable: making donations to charitable causes, funding schools or sponsoring 
community events and programs. No legal action can be taken for failing to do any of these, 
and not even everyone will agree that they belong to a corpora tion‘s ethical remit, but in 
themselves, they are choiceworthy actions. From Carroll‘s perspec tive, the CSR ideal is for a 
company – while producing a society‘s desired goods and services – to turn up a profit, obey 
the law, live up to ethical expectations, and contribute to philanthropic activities. 
Carroll makes an invaluable contribution in mapping out the different areas which comprise 
CSR. However, neither the limits between the categories nor the relations among them are as 
clear as he initially described. Profit should not be understood in purely economic terms; 
otherwise, non-profits or not-for-profits – such as Caritas Internationalis, Oxfam, or Save the 
children – would be paradigms of socially irresponsible organizations. Also, there may be 
compelling reasons to put legal obligations at the base. Corporations come into existence as 
creatures of law; so it would make sense for them to comply with legal requirements first 
before assuming any other kind of responsibility. Moreover, an excessively narrow concept of 
the ethical seems to be at work, pertaining to social expectations that have not been codified 
in law. 
 
However, ethics covers the whole range of responsibilities. Responsibility is primarily an ethical 
concept. No amount of insistence by law on any kind of responsibility would hold, if it lacked 
an ethical basis. Ethics is where the law ultimately draws its strength, although conversely, 
good law above all serves to lend muscle to ethics. Responsibility is a consequence of free 
action. A free and rational agent – in this case, the collective represented by the corporation – 
must respond to society for its actions and their consequences. The consideration of ethical  
responsibilities on the part of the corporation should not be postponed only until economic 
and legal obligations have been met. Finally, philanthropic or discretionary responsibilities 
are better explained as a subclass of ethical responsibilities. They refer to the aspirational 
goals of excellence that cannot be demanded, but only encouraged. They represent the 
perfection of freedom because they are carried out under no obligation from law. Inasmuch as 
there is no legal coercion involved, philanthropic or discretionary actions carry greater 
responsibility. Far from being the least important component of CSR, it should probably be 
given the place of honor. 
CSR has also received a lot of flak from the practical side. In response to criticisms 
regarding its lack of practicality, the notions of ―corporate  accountability,‖ ―corporate 
social responsiveness,‖ and ―corporate social performance‖  have  been developed. 
―Corporate accountability‖refers to the explicit recognition of the firm as a sociopolitical actor, 
just like government, with responsibilities not only to shareholders, but also to wider society 
(Crane and Matten, 2004, p. 55). Granted that corporations, willy nilly, assume functions 
previously attributed to government, privatizing tasks such as security and welfare provision, 
new mechanisms have to be introduced to hold them accountable to the public. Among these 
initiatives we find ―triple bottom line‖audits of a corporation‘s impacts on people, the planet 
and profits; stakeholder dialogs, which create a venue for discussion among social actors; 
public–private partnerships, which allow companies to work hand in hand with government 
agencies on particular issues; and transparency policies, through which firms make relevant 
decisions known to society. Since corporate activities have social as well as economic impacts, 
there is also a need for ―corporate social accounting,‖the measurement and reporting, both 
internal and external, of information concerning an organization‘s activi ties and impacts on 
society (Estes, 1976). 
―Corporate social responsiveness‖concentrates on the strategic and processual dimensions of 
CSR, manifested in a company‘s ability to respond to social pressures (Crane and Matten,  
2004, p. 48). Social pressures elicit four types of responses, ranging from the least to the most 
desirable: reaction, defense, accommodation, or proaction. Reaction means that the 
organization has been caught flat-footed and is hardly able to control events. Defense connotes 
an element of denial in assuming responsibility over a situation. Accommodation implies 
acceptance and assimilation of responsibility, and proaction signifies foresight and a capacity 
to maximize benefits and minimize damage. Nike, which at first denied or presented itself as a 
helpless client, almost a victim of unfair labor practices at its contractors‘ factories, ended up 
spearheading the drive to upgrade working conditions in the sector upon behest – on occasions, 
in form of a boycott – of consumers and the general public (Bernstein, 2004; Vietnam Labor 
Watch, 1997). This clearly illustrates a migration from reaction to proaction in corporate social 
responsiveness. 
―Corporate social performance‖combines the principles of CSR with the processes of 
corporate social responsiveness and the outcomes of corporate behavior (Wood, 1991). 
Outcomes are broken down into social policies (statements regarding the corporate mission, 
its values, beliefs, and goals), social programs (activities that materialize those policies), and 
social impacts (measurable changes brought about by those programs). For example, a 
company may include the protection of the environment in its mission statement. In 
consequence, it may enroll in the corresponding ISO certification program (ISO 26000, the 
social responsibility standard, will be published in 2010 as a voluntary standard. Although not 
a certification standard, it shall provide guidance for common concepts, definitions, and 
methods of evaluation). After a given period, the company could then cite positive pollution 
data that would lend substance to its claims. Recently ―corporate social performance‖has 
evolved into what is now known as ―global corporate citizenship‖(Wood et al., 2006). We 
shall return to this later. 
Aside from CSR and its derivatives, the other concept that has contributed  hugely to an 
altogether different understanding of the firm is ―stakeholder theory.‖The term 
―stakeholder‖was first coined in a Stanford Research Institute document on corpo rate 
planning in 1963, designating ―those groups without whose support the organization would 
cease to exist‖(Freeman, 1998, p. 602). The intention of the article was to broaden the group 
of people to whom management could be held responsible. A stakeholder would then refer to 
―any group or individual which can affect or is affected by an organization‖(Freeman,  1998, 
p. 602). Included among a company‘s stakeholders are its employees, customers, suppliers, 
competitors, the government, and the community, apart from its shareholders. Each is 
characterized by ―legitimate interests in procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporat e 
activity‖(Donaldson and Preston, 1995, p. 67). 
Rather than being a mere pun, the purpose of stakeholder theory is something very serious. 
Stakeholder theory rejects that the sole criterion in management should be its fiduciary duty 
toward shareholders and suggests that the stakes of all interested parties be considered. 
Demands to maximize share price and shareholder wealth ought to be tempered by a concern 
for the welfare of other stakeholders. 
Management‘s striving to protect the interests of all stakeholders clashes with the 
American legal tradition, which heavily favors shareholders (Boatright,  1999, p. 172). 
However, granting priority to the financial interests of shareholders does not mean 
granting them exclusivity, for even these could best be served – arguably – when framed 
in the long term. Although shareholder interests dominate, adopting a long -term 
perspective requires that managers include inputs from all the other stakeholder groups . 
Business transactions do not occur in a void and success would always depend on the 
amount of cooperation obtained from relevant stakeholders. As the American Bar Asso -
ciation Committee on Corporate Laws clarified, ―directors have fiduciary responsibili ties 
to shareholders which, while allowing directors to give consideration to the interests of 
others, could compel them to find reasonable relationship to the long-term interests of 
shareholders‖(Monks and Minow,  2001, p. 37). 
Continental European business thinking, more cognizant of the social embeddedness of 
business institutions, has always taken the interests of other social agents into account. This is 
especially true in the case of German-speaking countries, with their tradition of co-
determination (Mitbestimmung) in which labor representatives are granted the right to 
participate in high-level corporate deliberations (Charkham, 1995), as well as in Scandinavia, 
where industrial democracy has enjoyed a long and successful history (Nasi, 1995). 
In the case of Germany, the idea of employee participation draws from different sources, 
ranging from Catholic Social Teaching to radical democratic and socialist perspectives 
(European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007). In 
essence, it consists in the right of employees, together with the corresponding duties, to 
participate in decision making at the plant level, through the Works Councils (Betriebsráte), 
and in the firm level, through representatives on the supervisory boards (Aufsichtsráte) (Hans 
Bo¨chler Stiftung, 2004). First recognized by law in 1920, it has undergone modifications in 
accordance with the sector and size of the firms, as well as with the changing business 
environments in 1950, 1951, 1976, and 2004 (Go¨hner and Bráunig, 2004; The Federal 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 1980). Depending on a host of factors, employee repre-
sentation on the supervisory board could be a half or a third, although some suggest 
withdrawing it from the supervisory board and assigning it to an altogether different 
Consultative Council (Konsultationsrat). Nonetheless, the German law on co-determination 
currently serves as one of the models of the European Company (Societas Europea), together 
with the Dutch, French and minimalist or ála carte variants. 
Stakeholder theory enjoys the advantage of a broader and more realistic view of the 
corporation as a socially embedded institution. It identifies all the relevant social actors or 
stakeholders with whom the firm interacts and describes their reciprocal relations. Stakeholder 
theory has exerted a strong influence not only in business ethics (Donaldson and Preston, 
1995; Freeman, 1984, 1994), but also in organization theory (Dill, 1958; Thompson, 1967) and 
in finance and strategic management (Mason and Mitroff, 1982). Stakeholder theory 
encourages managers to strike a balance between long-term shareholder interests and the interests 
of all the other stakeholders. However, equilibrium is not always possible, nor should shareholder 
interests always have the priority. 
Take for example the Tylenol case, where Johnson & Johnson ordered the massive recall of 
potentially tampered products, protecting consumers at the expense of shareholders 
(Mallenbaker.net, 2006). In 1982, Tylenol commanded 35% of the analgesic market in the US 
and represented 15% ofJohnson & Johnson‘s profits. As a result of the scare, the company took 
a $100 million charge against earnings and market value fell by a billion dollars. The rationale 
behind Johnson & Johnson‘s behavior is found in its credo: ―We believe our first responsibility 
is to the doctors, nurses and patients, to mothers and fathers and all others who use our 
products and services‖(Johnson and Johnson, 2006). Although stakeholder theory could have 
contributed to raising awareness of the other parties affected by the company‘s activities, 
nothing in it indicated that customer interests should prevail. That requires something more 
than a ―balancing of interests‖and points out to what may be called a theory of the firm 
premised on the ―common good.‖We have witnessed an ever-broadening understanding of 
the people who constitute a corporation. We began with owner-managers, then continued 
with the professional class of workers and managers, and ended with the whole range of 
stakeholder groups. We have also observed a change in the grasp of corporate responsibility, 
from a purely economic and legal one, directed exclusively toward shareholders, to one that 
encompasses social and ethical duties to other stakeholders. What we have gained in breadth 
we seem to have lost in clarity with regard to managerial decision-making, however. Simply 
―balancing out‖different and oftentimes conflicting stakeholder interests does not guarantee 
good corporate decisions. Instead, these seem to require a more enlightened understanding of 
the ―common good‖and the business organization‘s specific contribution to it. Yet, to speak of 
the ―common good‖means to enter into the province proper of politics, and this leads us right 
into the discussion of ―corporate citizenship.‖―Corporate citizenship‖(CC) is a term first used 
by practitioners, by people working in corporations, and later popularized by American 
business press writers in the 1980s (Crane et al., 2003). It was originally meant to emphasize, 
broaden and redirect specific dimensions of CSR, and as such was adopted by the academy. 
Obviously, CC cannot be taken literally, meaning that corporations are real citizens vested 
with the corresponding rights and duties in the state. For that to be true, the corporation 
would have to be an individual, physical person. At most, it could only be a fictional, legal 
person. The term indicates, rather, that the being or identity and the activities of corporations 
within society could somehow be studied through the lens of citizenship. CC therefore 
borrows from political theory, the discipline in which the notion of citizenship is native, with 
the hope that it will shed light on the constitution and dynamics of corporations  as social 
institutions. 
Beyond the metaphor of  corporate ci t izenship  
Business theory borrowed the notion of citizenship from politics for several reasons. The major 
one is to highlight the social dimension of business organizations, and consequently, to analyze 
the role of power in resolving conflicts. Through the concept of citizenship, politics also lends 
to business firms a sense of identity, by way of membership in the community, and a 
justification for their rights and responsibilities as artificial  or legal persons, being a channel 
for participating in community life. Wood and associates go as far as affirming that business 
organizations, in comparison to individual or physical persons, are ‗‗secondary citizens‖(Wood 
et al., 2006, pp. 35–36). Although we normally treat business organizations as independent 
legal entities, they only exist thanks to the objectives and resources furnished by human 
incorporators. Corporations are collective instruments created by individual citizens to achieve 
ends which they, otherwise, would not be able to reach. Those ends are most likely to have a 
sociopolitical dimension and reflect the values of the community.  
However, the notion of citizenship itself has had a long history, and to discover its potential 
in clarifying the status of corporations and the issues concerning how corporations ought to be 
governed, it would be convenient to have a look into its origins and evolution.  
According to Aristotle, ‗‗a citizen in the strictest sense, against whom no such except ion 
can be taken‖is he who ‗‗shares in the administration of justice, and in offices‖(Aristotle,  
1990). The essential task of the citizen is to participate in deciding what is good and just in 
the state and in putting this into effect. A few lines later he specifies that a citizen is a 
‗‗juryman and member of the assembly,‖to whom ‗‗is reserved the right of deliberating or 
judging about some things or about all things‖(Aristotle,  1990). Although many people in a 
state may actually participate in the process of deliberating and deciding on the public good, 
only citizens have the right to do so. What characterizes a citizen, therefore, is ‗‗the power to 
take part in the deliberative or judicial administration of any state‖(Aristotle, 1990). This 
does not mean, however, that a citizen always has to hold state office. It would suffice that he 
at least has the power to occupy such a post, for citizenship requires ‗‗sharing in governing and 
being governed‖(Aristotle, 1990). In other words, one does not lose citizenship when being 
governed and out of office, as long as he can also govern and hold office in turn at some other 
time. 
Twenty-four centuries later, several models and typologies of citizenship – based on 
differences in the kinds of states – have been offered (Crane and Matten, 2004; Stokes, 2002; 
Wood et al., 2006). Closer scrutiny reveals that these categories could be collapsed into two: 
liberal-minimalist citizenship and civic republican or communitarian citizenship.  
The liberal-minimalist ideal conceives citizenship as freedom from oppression and 
protection against the arbitrary rule of an absolutist government or state (Crane et al., 2003, pp. 
7–9). Citizens are vested with political rights enabling them to choose their rulers, to vote and 
to be voted into public office. The duty of government is to secure these political rights which 
form the core of citizenship. For some, this minimum is composed of the rights to life, to 
liberty and to property (Locke); for others, in the right to a just share of the social product or 
utility (Smith, Bentham); while for still others, it consists in the universal rights to equality 
before the law and to free rational agency or autonomy (Kant). What is important is that this 
minimum be guaranteed. With a certain amount of latitude we can include in this group the 
libertarians (Wood et al., 2006, pp. 41–42, 44), who support a very limited state, and those 
who uphold a deliberative democracy (Crane et al.,  2003, pp. 15–16), who may want a more 
robust form of government to safeguard conditions of equality in political discourse. Both 
persuasions are particularly concerned with rights. 
Civic republican or communitarian citizenship emphasizes participation in the pub lic good 
through the fostering of community ties and the practice of civic virtues (Crane et al.,  2003, 
p. 9; Wood et al., 2006, pp. 42–43). While liberal-minimalist citizenship is marked off by 
―negative freedoms‖or ―freedoms from‖state oppression and in terference, civic republican 
or communitarian citizenship is set apart by ―positive freedoms‖or ―freedoms to‖actively 
seek and work together with others for the common good. Liberal-minimalist citizenship 
stresses individual rights or state-guaranteed powers against all collectives; civic republican 
or communitarian citizenship underscores belonging to the group as the factor constitutive of 
identity and the element that lends meaning to action. It is the group or collective with its 
hierarchically ordered set of goods, rules, and practices that makes virtue or human 
excellence possible. 
Within the civic republican or communitarian mindset, the role of government or the state 
is to strengthen institutions as families, neighborhoods, schools, churches, and so forth, such 
that the good is rewarded, rules upheld and practices allowed to flourish. Only when these 
institutions are lacking should government intervene, without losing sight of its subsidiary 
function. State coercive power should be used so that evil is minimized, sanctioned and 
punished. There is greater insistence on fulfilling obligations – to protect the family, obey 
the law, pay taxes and comply with jury or military service, and so forth – than on 
demanding rights, which separate the individual from the group. Developmental democracy 
(J. S. Mill) may be said to favor civic republican or communitarian citizenship in the 
understanding that ties and obligations link one more to civil society than to the state or 
government (Crane et al., 2003, pp. 14–15). 
Liberal-minimalist citizenship guarantees one the right to stand up to the group; civic 
republican or communitarian citizenship admonishes one to par ticipate in social affairs 
and contribute to the common good well beyond the periodic exercise of political rights or 
voting. Liberal-minimalist citizenship is limited with regard to rights; civic republican or 
communitarian citizenship, maximalist in terms of duties, obligations and virtues. Insofar as 
Aristotle accentuates the embeddedness of citizenship in a particular sociocultural and 
historical context, as well as the mutual dependence between the human excellence of the 
citizen and the excellence of polis or the state, he sides himself with the civic republican or 
communitarian model. 
How do these different views of citizenship measure up with the notion of the corporation 
as a citizen, as a ―corporate citizen‖? As a citizen in the liberal -minimalist mold, a 
corporation would be expected, first and foremost, to zealously protect its ―right to 
exist,‖based on the freedom of association  of its incorporators, and its ―license to 
operate,‖resting on the freedom of enterprise. A corporation would very much prefer ―to 
stick to its own business‖and embark on philanthropic activities only with reluctance. In such 
instances – necessarily few and far between – corporations could justify their behavior in the 
key of ―enlightened self-interest‖; that is, corporate philanthropy is all right because it 
ultimately benefits the economic bottom line, it‘s just an additional ―cost of doing 
business.‖In all the other social and political issues, the corporation as liberal -minimalist 
citizen would be quite content to remain passive. This description of liberal-minimalist 
corporate citizenship would correspond to a mix of what other authors call limited and 
equivalent views of CC (Crane and Matten, 2004, pp. 63–67). Similarly, it would have great 
affinity with a shareholder view of the firm focused exclusively in increasing share price. 
On the other hand, if a corporation were to follow the civic republican or communitarian 
type of citizenship, apart from exercising political, civil, and social rights, it would also strive 
to fulfill political, civil, and social obligations. Such a company would not hesitate to step in, 
harnessing resources and expertise, when it considers government or the state to be remiss in 
its duties. In particular, it could provide social rights (e.g., healthcare or housing), enable civil 
rights (e.g., be an ―equal opportunity employer‖) and serve as a channel for the exercise of 
political rights (e.g., host a forum for political debate on certain issues). This sort of company 
would not be troubled in justifying sociopolitical action because it thinks that its mission 
transcends purely economic goals. Active involvement in community affairs and uninhibited 
political activism characterizes the civic republican or communitarian corporate citizen. For 
the civic republican or communitarian corporate citizen, responsibility is not only of an 
economic nature, but also sociopolitical as well; and it is owed not only to shareholders, but 
also to other stakeholder groups. A company of this type falls within the extended view of CC 
(Crane and Matten, 2004, pp. 67–70). 
Cit izens of the corporate poli ty  
Finally, there is another possible interpretation of CC, different from the understanding of 
the corporation itself as a citizen of the state. It consists in the view of the corporation as an 
analog of the state and of the various stakeholder groups as potential citizens. The approach 
and intent is similar to that carried out by Manville and Ober (2003) who tried to draw 
management lessons from classical Athenian democracy, although the outcomes will be 
somewhat different. 
Drawing inspiration from the study by Wood and associates on the different approaches to 
CC, we may link the liberal-minimalist perspective of citizenship to a notion of the corporation 
as a mere ―civic association‖and the civic republican or communi tarian view to a more 
substantive idea of the firm as a corporate polity (Wood et al.,  2006, pp. 41–45). The liberal-
minimalist theory of citizenship insists, above all, on the value of individual freedom – dressed 
in the language of rights – in order to pursue one‘s selfinterests. The satisfaction of these 
individual selfinterests, insofar as divergent or rivalrous, cannot constitute a corporate common 
good. The corporation is then reduced to a ―civic association‖or ―clearing house‖where the 
minimum restraints are applied to keep an individual from infringing on the rights of another. 
The different groups of people dealing with the corporation do not really behave as 
―citizens‖but as mere ―residents of a common jurisdiction.‖They comply with the laws, but 
only as a means to reach individual goals, and not because it forms part of an excellence that is 
both personal and shared. For the liberal-minimalist citizens of such a corporation, coercive 
laws are the only forces that keep them together. Outside of this, there is no  attachment or 
loyalty among themselves or between them and the corporation. Hence, relationships are 
purely contractual, and the corporation, essentially, becomes nothing more than a ―nexus of 
contracts.‖Shareholder-principals who provide capital are granted ownership rights and 
manager-agents are hired in the understanding that they will maximize the former party‘s 
investment returns. The corporation is just an empty shell wherein investment, employment 
and sales contracts are negotiated and fulfilled: ―The language of citizenship might even be 
used, but the motivation is not to provide a collective good or to contribute to society‘s [or we 
may say in this case, the corporation‘s] well being, but only to achieve a private end‖(Wood et 
al., 2006, p. 42). 
The demands of a civic republican or communitarian kind of citizenship on the stakeholders 
who comprise the corporate polity will be altogether different. In the premise that their 
personal flourishing is not independent from the flourishing of the corporate polity, they 
actively participate in the deliberation and execution of the corporate good. This does not 
mean that there would be no regard for individual rights; it simply means that those ri ghts are 
neither supreme nor absolute goods. Rather, the recognition, enforcement and respect for 
those individual rights should always be done within the context of the corporate common 
good. The common good is not inimical to individual goods such as rights, properly 
understood. All that is needed is an order or hierarchy, such that ―goods in respect of 
another‖– for instance, rights – are subjected to ―goods in themselves,‖and the various ―goods 
in themselves‖subjected in turn to the supreme and absolute good which is the ―common 
good‖of the corporate polity. In all probability, the right to free enterprise would not include 
the right to buy and sell body parts, if only to safeguard the physical integrity of prospective 
suppliers, for instance. 
A misconstrual of the common good and its relationship with individual goods is at the 
root of the conflict that Wood and colleagues detect between communitarian and global 
citizenships (Wood et al., 2006, pp. 42–46). At a superficial level, a strong attachment to 
one‘s local community may be at odds with an equally robust relationship with a 
multicultural global society. But global society and the local community do not exist on the 
same level, no more than the local community and the family. No doubt serious conflicts 
among these different levels and forms of organization may arise. However, the strength and 
success of the superior levels in terms of human flourishing depends on the strength and  success 
of the inferior levels, through an interplay of the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity.  
To end, let us try to clarify this relationship further by means of an example. A corporation 
that applies pollution control measures in its home community but neglects them in other 
communities where it is a mere guest is simply not a good corporate citizen, even by the 
communitarian standard. It need not follow a free-standing ―universalist‖standard ofglobal 
citizenship to recognize its duty to reduce pollution wherever it holds operations; it would be 
sufficient to become aware of the interdependence between its home and host communities, 
between its efforts to curb pollution locally and globally. Otherwise, the communitarian form of 
citizenship would fall into an incoherence. Only by identifying and fully integrating itself with 
the good of its home region – that is, by subscribing to the communitarian ideal of citizenship – 
can a corporation realistically contribute to the good of a wider global and multicultural society. 
Conclusion 
The introduction of CSR and stakeholder theory has triggered important modifications in 
response to the question of who constitutes the firm. CSR has widened the scope of the 
firm‘s obligations from the economic and legal spheres to the social and ethical ones. 
Stakeholder theory has broadened the groups to whom the firm is held accountable. Apart 
from the initial group of shareholders, among the firm‘s stakeholders we now include 
workers, customers, suppliers, competitors, government or the state, communities, and so 
forth. 
There are significant differences in the manner in which both CSR and stakeholder theory 
have been understood, developed and put into practice in the United States and in Europe. 
Because of its tradition of individualism, legalism and pragmatism, business culture in the 
United States is more reluctant to accept the view of the firm as a socially embedded 
institution, unlike in Continental Europe, where this notion is welcome and prevalent despite 
variations. 
Applying the political concept of citizenship to the corporation is useful in several ways. It 
highlights the social dimension of the corporation as an insti tution, it provides a source of 
identity or belonging, and it offers a justification of the different rights and responsibilities that 
the corporation possesses as an artificial or legal person.  
In its origins, as explained to us by Aristotle, ―citizen‖preeminently applies to an adult, 
ablebodied male, himself the son of citizen-parents, who enjoys sufficient economic means 
to actively engage in the governance of his home city-state, by voting or being voted into 
office. Although a state may require other classes of people in order to be viable, citizens 
form the most important group among them all. The definition of a citizen may vary 
according to the regime or form of government – Aristotle‘s description best fits citizens in a 
democracy. However, in the best of states, the characteristics of a good citizen fully coincide 
with those of an excellent human being. 
In more recent times, the discussion of citizenship has revolved around two distinct models. 
Liberalminimalist citizenship stresses the ―negative freedoms‖– such as freedom from 
oppression or arbitrary rule, especially by the state – and its discourse is based on the language 
of rights. The primary duty of the state or government is to secure these rights. Civic 
republican or communitarian citizenship, on the other hand, focuses on active participation in 
the common good by fostering community ties and promoting civic virtues. The emphasis lies 
in the fulfillment ofduties and obligations toward the group. Government and the state are 
expected, above all, to act in a subsidiary manner and strengthen already existing institutions 
such as families, schools, churches, and so forth. Aristotelian doctrine undoubtedly comes 
closer to civic republican or communitarian citizenship than to the liberal -minimalist model. 
There are at least two possible readings of the expression ―corporate citizenship.‖The more 
widely spread one consists in imagining the corporation as a citizen of the state where it 
operates. According to the liberal-minimalist perspective, such a corporate citizen will be 
primarily concerned with protecting its rights to pursue mainly economic interests, that is, 
those of its shareholders. This sort of company will be very reluctant to involve itself with 
broader social and political issues. From the civic 
republican or communitarian viewpoint, by contrast, the company as citizen should have no 
trouble engaging in sociopolitical actions because its mission transcends purely economic 
goals. The firm owes itself to many other people – the different stakeholder groups – besides 
its shareholders. 
Accordingly, Anglo-American business culture defends corporate citizenship in this sense 
of a liberal-minimalist type, while continental European business culture is inclined toward a 
civic republican or communitarian type. 
The second – and less conventional – understanding of ―corporate citizenship‖consists in 
taking the different stakeholder groups as potential citizens of the corporation, held to be an 
analog of the state. The liberal-minimalist persuasion in citizenship then conceives the 
corporation as a ―civic association‖formed by the ―nexus of contracts‖among different  agents 
exercising their rights. Each of these agents has its own individual goal with respect to which 
the corporation is just a means. The civic republican or communitarian model of citizenship, 
for its part, perceives the corporation as a ―corporate polity‖whose flourishing is reciprocally 
dependent on the flourishing of its various stakeholder-constituents. In this regard, every 
stakeholder-constituent is admonished to actively take part in the deliberation and 
execution of the corporate common good. While there is certainly room to defend the 
rights of corporate citizens in this sense, as powers beyond the control of the state or its 
analogs, in line with the liberal-minimalist and Anglo-American traditions, we believe 
that the civic republican or communitarian and continental European traditions of 
corporate citizenship are superior, as it better facilitates the achievement of the corporate 
common good. 
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